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 Razorbacks, Ticky Cows, and the
 Closing of the Georgia Open Range:
 The Dynamics of Institutional Change
 Uncovered
 SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR
 This article attempts to explain why the adoption of potentially productive
 institutions is delayed and why inefficient ones persist by exploring the dynamics
 of institutional change in a particular historical case-the closing of the Georgia
 open range in the late nineteenth century. A closed range policy would have
 generated net benefits for specific regions of Georgia, but distributional conflicts,
 coupled with high transaction costs, made a voluntary agreement to do that
 unattainable. The article describes the Georgia legislature's important role in
 facilitating the adoption of a policy that led to more rapid agricultural development
 in the postbellum period.
 New institutional economists have emphasized the significant role
 that institutional change plays in determining economic prosperity.
 They have, however, paid little attention to the nuances that surround
 this transformation. As recent theoretical and empirical work has
 shown, the dynamics of institutional change are not as fluid as early
 research on the subject has suggested.' Distributional conflicts, trans-
 action costs, and political intervention are crucial determinants of the
 path of institutional change and development.
 The goal of this article is to provide a detailed, micro-level empirical
 investigation of the process of institutional change in one particular
 case-namely, the closing of the Georgia open range from 1872 through
 The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Dec. 1991). ? The Economic History
 Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 0022-0507.
 The author is Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721.
 I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, the John
 Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation, the Anna and James McDonnell Memorial
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 Kousser, John Ledyard, Gary Libecap, Roger Ransom, Paul Rhode, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal
 have been particularly generous with the provision of comments and criticisms during my work on
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 ' Research that predicts institutions will adjust in order to capture untapped efficiency gains
 includes Coase, "The Problem"; Demsetz, "Toward a Theory"; Davis and North, Institutional
 Change; and North, Structure and Change. For theoretical papers suggesting that this view is
 overly sanguine, see Mailath and Postlewaite, "Asymmetric Information"; Robb, "Pollution
 Claim Settlements"; Farrell, "Information and the Coase Theorem"; Samuelson, "A Comment on
 the Coase Theorem"; Crawford, "A Theory of Disagreement"; and Arrow, "The Property Rights
 Doctrine." Historical analyses of the same include Rosenthal, "The Development of Irrigation";
 Binger and Hoffman, "Institutional Persistence"; Hoffman, "Institutions and Agriculture";
 Libecap, "Distributional Issues"; Libecap and Wiggins, "The Influence of Private Contractual
 Failure"; and McCloskey, "The Economics of Enclosure."
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 1890. The traditional agricultural practice in Georgia was to allow
 animals to roam the countryside freely and to force farmers to erect
 fences around their crops. All unfenced land was considered common
 pasture that could be used by anyone. After the Civil War, however,
 there was a concerted effort to eradicate the open range policy and to
 enforce strict property rights to all land-fenced or unfenced, improved
 or unimproved.
 According to estimates presented here, closing the range would have
 generated net benefits for many counties in the state, especially in areas
 with high shares of improved acreage. Most of these counties, however,
 maintained the status quo. While the aggregate net benefits were
 positive, I argue that the transaction costs of voluntarily resolving some
 related distributional conflicts were prohibitive. Empirical evidence
 shows that the Georgia legislature's role in facilitating the institutional
 change was crucial. The legislature allowed county and, later, sub-
 county referenda on the fence question which significantly reduced the
 bargaining power of those opposed to dispensing with the open range.
 Most importantly, the legislature promised to enforce sidepayments
 between expected winners and losers if the new law were adopted at the
 local level. When compensation for a subset of the expected losers was
 guaranteed by the legislature, these voters responded as might be
 expected-they voted in favor of the new institution. For many Georgia
 counties that would have profited from closing the range, the govern-
 ment-endorsed sidepayment scheme proved necessary for the adoption
 of the institutional change that led to more rapid agricultural develop-
 ment in postbellum Georgia.
 An important conclusion of the article is that traditional theories of
 institutional change tend to be overly optimistic. A close study of the
 Georgia fence problem reveals that net expected benefits are neither a
 necessary nor sufficient condition for the adoption of an alternative
 property rights arrangement. Distributional conflicts, coupled with high
 transaction costs, make voluntary change difficult. When the govern-
 ment is called in, almost any outcome is feasible. Although the focus
 here is narrow, it offers insights into the process of institutional change
 in a world in which trades are not effected costlessly. A study of the
 Georgia fence problem helps to unravel the mystery as to why some
 inefficient institutions persist, while others are pushed aside to make
 room for economic growth and development.
 THE GEORGIA OPEN RANGE AND THE CALL FOR REFORM
 Since colonial times Georgia planters were required to keep fences
 around their growing crops or else any "trespass or damage so ever he
 shall receive or sustain by hogs, cattle, or horses shall be his own
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 loss "2 In fact, a 1759 law provided detailed specifications of what
 constituted a "lawful" fence.3 Instead of forcing livestock owners to
 control their animals, the fence law permitted citizens to allow their
 animals to roam the countryside freely. It should be noted that farmers
 were not legally compelled to put a fence around their fields. In order to
 sue for damages caused by a marauding animal, however, a legal fence
 had to be erected. If an animal happened to get into a farmer's enclosed
 field and destroyed a portion of the crop, the farmer's fence had to meet
 the specifications of the code; otherwise, he had no basis to sue the
 animal's owner for compensation. Moreover, if the farmer killed or
 maimed an animal straying onto his ill-fenced land, then the animal's
 owner could claim treble damages. In essence, the fence law created an
 open range, or a commons, whereby every citizen had the "right" to
 graze his animals on any land that was left unfenced.
 In most areas of the colonial and antebellum South, farms were far
 apart, the land was heavily wooded, and population density was low.
 Whereas the open range seemed to have been an economical response
 to the demography and geography of colonial America, the late ante-
 bellum and postbellum eras brought a new attitude toward the profit-
 ability of fencing out animals and fencing in crops. "Excessive Fencing
 is peculiarly an American abuse, which urgently cries for reform,"
 clamored Horace Greeley, who was certainly not alone in blasting the
 fence law as "needless and indefensible.' 4 Farmers, particularly those
 from the South, were told to ask themselves: "Are we an agricultural or
 stockraising people. . . ?"s As the editor of the Jackson County
 (Georgia) newspaper succinctly noted, "it is sad evidence of old
 fogyism, general ignorance and backwardness of agriculture in the
 South that such a law as that now in force can exist."6 Given the
 destruction caused by the Civil War, agricultural "progressives" argued
 that it was time for innovation. With confidence, reformers claimed that
 a "stock law," or the fencing in of animals instead of crops, would be
 the first step toward bringing southern farmers out of relative poverty
 and toward agricultural prosperity.7
 2 Quoted in King, "The Closing of the Southern Range," p. 53. For a discussion of the
 development of the "fence law," or open range, policy in America, see Washburn and Moen, The
 Fence Question, pp. 10-14. For a discussion pertaining to New England in particular, see Cronon,
 Changes in the Land, chap. 7.
 3 Hahn, in The Roots of Southern Populism, pp. 60-61, provided a description of a late
 nineteenth-century lawful fence.
 4 Greeley, What I Know of Farming, p. 219.
 5 "Fructus" in Southern Cultivator, 35 (Aug. 1877), p. 299.
 6 Jefferson Forest News, Apr. 23, 1880.
 7 The debate between fence law and stock law advocates is quite interesting and covers the
 gamut of economic, political, religious, and social issues. Since the debate has been covered in
 depth in previous works, I will not dwell on it here. See Kantor and Kousser, "Common Sense or
 Commonwealth?"; Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism, pp. 239-54; Flynn, White Land, pp.
 130-45; and Bonner, Georgia's Last Frontier, pp. 139-43.
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 What would cause people to seek a change in the open range policy
 that had been accepted practice for well over a century? Harold
 Demsetz, for example, has argued that "property rights develop to
 internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger
 than the cost of internalization."8 Similarly, Lance Davis and Douglass
 North have theorized that institutional change tends to come about
 when the net present value of a new regime of property rights exceeds
 that of the traditional set of rights.9 As an economy progresses through
 time, the costs and benefits of each feasible institutional arrangement
 continuously change, causing individuals and groups to constantly
 update their decisions concerning the appropriate arrangement for
 society. As late nineteenth-century farmers in the South witnessed the
 tangible and increasing loss of land, labor, and capital caused by the
 fence requirement, many began to argue that the traditional practice of
 allowing animals to forage freely was no longer compatible with
 maximum agricultural efficiency. When "the subject [was] . . . reduced
 to dollars and cents," fence reformers were convinced that agricultural
 prosperity-in fact, overall economic growth-depended on their inno-
 vation. 10
 The open range, reformers argued, was an anachronism. They
 acknowledged that allowing animals to roam at will was a tenable policy
 when farms were isolated and population density was low. But as
 economic and demographic changes were developing in the postbellum
 period, many believed that the traditional fence law had outlived its
 purpose. As population density rose, the probability that one person's
 roving animals would destroy another's crops increased. Certainly, a
 farmer could sue if an animal destroyed his crops, but he had to have
 evidence of the trespass and it was impossible for him to constantly
 watch his fields. Therefore, holding everything else constant, increased
 population density led to an increase in the relative costs of maintaining
 the open range policy and made fencing animals a more attractive
 option.
 The doubling of the railroad network in postbellum Georgia also
 increased the relative benefits associated with fence reform. Since
 railroad right of ways were not required to be fenced under Georgia law,
 trains often hit animals that wandered onto the tracks. The Georgia
 Supreme Court decided that as long as the railroad could show that it
 8 Demsetz, "Toward a Theory," p. 350. See also Demsetz, "Some Aspects of Property
 Rights. "
 9 Davis and North, Institutional Change, especially chaps. 1-4.
 10 Jackson Herald, July 20, 1883. Georgia farmers understood well the importance of healthy
 agricultural development. Petitioning the state legislature for the establishment of more experi-
 mental farms, the Georgia State Agricultural Society conceded that "other pursuits may have more
 brilliant rewards, and other industries may claim more flattering recognition, but this truth
 underlies all our hopes of material prosperity, that with a languishing agriculture all other business
 enterprise and investment must suffer." Georgia General Assembly, "Report," pp. 1-2.
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 exercised "ordinary and reasonable diligence" in its attempt to avoid
 killing a wandering animal, then it could escape liability." Yet railroad
 companies did not escape the payment of damages completely. Samples
 from the annual reports of three companies suggest that railroads were
 forced to pay approximately $19.90 (in 1880 dollars) per track-mile for
 livestock killed because of the railroads' negligence.'2 According to
 these data, if the closed range policy had been instituted throughout
 Georgia in 1880, the railroad industry would have saved approximately
 one million dollars in damage payments. 13 This figure does not consider
 the dollar amount spent on repairing damage to trains that hit livestock,
 the monetary value of medical attention given to injured passengers,
 and lawyers' fees. In addition, it does not include the value of livestock
 killed in situations when the railroad was not deemed negligent.
 The expansion of the railroad in the postbellum period increased the
 opportunity cost of maintaining the status quo in another way as well.
 When railroads arrived in areas previously without a connection,
 farmers were able to import relatively inexpensive fertilizers that raised
 cotton yields per acre. In addition, the railroad provided an efficient
 means for farmers to export their cotton surplus to major marketing
 centers. 14 In many areas of Georgia, the simultaneous expansion of the
 population and the railroad network created a new problem for farm-
 ers-how to use the available productive land more efficiently. With
 animals fenced in, advocates of reform predicted that improved acreage
 could be expanded.
 Supporters of the closed range saw two sources of unimproved land
 that could be brought into cultivation-the wasted land used as fence
 rows and the patches of fertile ground too small to justify expenditure on
 a lawful fence. Nineteenth-century southern farmers, for the most part,
 enclosed their crops with "worm" fences which were constructed by
 laying the ends of the rails on top of one another in a zigzag fashion;
 11 See, for example, The Georgia Railroad Company and Banking Company v. Neely; The
 Central Railroad v. Hamilton; The Georgia Railroad Company and Banking Company v. Walker;
 and The Central Railroad v. Summerford.
 12 The amount of "stock damage-paid for cattle, horses, mules, hogs, etc., killed and injured"
 was obtained from the South-Western Railroad Company, the Georgia Railroad and Banking
 Company, and the Atlanta and West-Point Railroad Company. From each report I determined the
 value of livestock killed per mile of track operated. The figures were converted to 1880 dollars using
 the Warren and Pearson Wholesale Price Index, Series E-12, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical
 Statistics. The constant 1880 dollar values per mile were $29.55 in 1861, $13.82 in 1866, $11.79 in
 1869, $29.21 in 1877, $23.76 in 1880, and $11.28 in 1884. The average of $19.90 per track-mile was
 used in my computations.
 13 The $1,000,000 figure is the discounted net present value of the stream of estimated payments
 that Georgia railroads would have made to livestock owners after 1879. For the calculation, I
 assume that railroad track mileage remained constant after 1889. This, of course, biases the
 estimate downward. The discount rate used is 7 percent, following Ransom and Sutch, One Kind
 of Freedom, p. 208.
 14 For a discussion of the railroads' influence on the Upcountry economy, see Hahn, The Roots
 of Southern Populism, pp. 145-52; and Weiman, "The Economic Emancipation."
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 thus, wasting a width of seven to eight feet of productive land as a fence
 row.15 Since the average tilled acreage per farm in Georgia counties was
 55.3 (with a standard deviation of 24.2), and assuming that worm fences
 spanned seven feet, we can calculate that at a minimum between 1.5 and
 2.4 percent, or 115,354 to 184,567 acres, of the productive land in
 Georgia was wasted in the form of fence rows. 16 Of course, this estimate
 does not represent all of the productive land that could be brought into
 cultivation if the closed range policy were enacted. The calculation
 ignores the small fertile patches of land not profitable enough to justify
 a costly fence. In addition, farmers expected to save resources and time
 when expensive annual fence repairs could be eradicated.17 Certainly
 there were benefits associated with enclosing animals, but the important
 question from a social income maximization point of view was: would
 the benefits of fence reform have exceeded the costs of changing to a
 closed range policy?
 THE PROFITABILITY OF REFORM
 Using the data in the 1880 Agricultural Census, it is possible to
 provide an approximation of the expected profit or loss that each county
 in Georgia would have realized had the stock law been instantaneously
 implemented in 1880.18 If it had and if farmers had immediately adjusted
 to the incentives created by the new law, then all animals would have
 been enclosed and farmers could have removed the fences surrounding
 their crops of cotton and grains and planted the land previously wasted
 as fence rows. The net profit from growing crops on the old fence rows
 would have been the total value of the produce minus the cost of feeding
 the previously nonpastured animals minus the cost of producing the
 crops. In order to make the calculations, I have assumed that the wasted
 acreage equaled the lower-bound estimate of 1.5 percent of the im-
 proved acreage and that farmers grew two types of crops on their
 15 In a letter to the Southern Cultivator, 36 (Jan. 1878), p. 7, a "Subscriber" maintained that the
 fence occupied a total distance of seven feet across. It should be noted that "Subscriber" was a
 pro-fence advocate. Washburn and Moen, The Fence Question, p. 16, whose ultimate goal was to
 advertise the benefits of using barbed wire, claimed that eight feet of land was wasted by the worm
 fence.
 16 If worm fences spanned seven feet and crops were grown in perfectly square plots of land,
 with sides of length x feet, then the ratio of productive land wasted can be expressed as a function
 1(x) = (28x - 196)/x2. I use feet, instead of acres or hectares, for simplicity. Assuming square plots
 of land, it is easy to convert acres into the length in feet. One acre of land equals 43,560 square feet.
 Therefore, given the acreage of a piece of land, the length of the sides (in feet) equals the square
 root of 43,560 times the number of acres. Data on tilled acreage per farm were obtained from
 aggregate county level data in U.S. Census Office, Report, pp. 109-11.
 17 Contemporaries believed that fences depreciated at an annual rate of 10 percent. See Jefferson
 Forest News, Apr. 23, 1880. Also, see the "Extract from a lecture by Donald J. Mitchell, before
 Connecticut Board of Agriculture," Southern Cultivator, 34 (Dec. 1876), p. 465, for annual
 depreciation estimates of between 11.1 and 18.2 percent.
 18 For a detailed description of the net profitability calculation, see Kantor, "Property Rights,"
 appendix A.
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 newfound land: cotton on the old fence rows of the cotton acreage and
 corn, peas, and fodder on the wasted land from the corn, wheat, rye,
 and oat fields.19 Estimation of the costs of fencing the animals is a
 problem because some were already kept in pastures, while others were
 roaming the open range. I arbitrarily assigned livestock to available
 pasturage that existed before the hypothetical institutional change and
 estimated a feed allowance for animals that were previously unenclosed
 and were now behind fences. Since some animal owners probably
 overinvested in livestock under the open range policy, and because my
 calculation considers all of the animals reported by the Census, too
 much grain will be allocated to feeding the previously nonpastured
 animals. This assumption biases the profitability estimate downward,
 strengthening the final result.
 In many parts of the state, farmers could have maintained fewer
 fences under a closed range policy. After the stock law was enacted,
 farmers are assumed to have put their animals into pastures and to have
 supplemented their diets with other grains. To approximate the savings
 from maintaining fewer fences, I estimated the value of the difference in
 the depreciation of crop fences before the stock law and of the fences
 needed to enclose the previously nonpastured animals after the stock
 law. Farmers would have borne an additional one-time cost of building
 fences around the newly created pasture. They might have moved the
 wood from old fences to enclose their new pasture; however, I assumed
 that farmers paid the maximum cost of building a new fence, $1.90 per
 acre, which again biases the net benefits downward. Thus, the final
 profitability measure equals the net profit from growing crops on old
 fence rows plus the depreciation saved by maintaining fewer fences
 minus the one-time cost of building fences for animals previously
 unenclosed.
 Table 1 shows the net present value, over an infinite time horizon, of
 the social profitability or unprofitability of the stock law using 1880 data
 and a discount rate of 7 percent. The results show the weighted average
 and per capita value of benefits (or costs) for the six conventional
 regions of Georgia. The profit measure is also shown as a percentage of
 the total value of farm produce grown within the region in 1879. The
 results are robust to changes in key assumptions and should be viewed
 as minimum values.20 The net present value calculation does not allow
 farmers to adjust their improved acreage, their crop mix, or the size of
 their livestock herds over time. Regions expecting a loss from the stock
 law could have adjusted to the law and avoided the full loss reported in
 19 It seems reasonable to assume that corn, peas, and fodder were all planted together. See
 "Consolidated Reports of Crops, &c., Circular No. 21," in Georgia Dept. of Agriculture,
 Publications.
 20 Kantor, "Property Rights," table 3.Al, contains sensitivity tests.
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 TABLE 1
 DISCOUNTED NET PRESENT VALUE OF EXPECTED PROFITABILITY
 OF THE STOCK LAW, BY REGION IN 1880
 As Percent Improved
 Weighted Per of Value of Acreage
 Region N Meana Capita Produce Sharea
 Mountain 17 $ -12,895b $ -2 00b -7.1% 23.4%
 Upcountry 26 108,769 6.97 16.1 36.9
 Plantation Belt 63 167,439 10.31 21.2 42.3
 Pine Barrens 9 -101,365 -14.96 -35.1 13.0
 Wiregrass 16 -81,708 -14.75 -39.2 12.0
 Coast 6 -82,203 -6.34 -29.6 12.6
 Counties with Law by 1882C 14 191,195 11.91 21.7 46.8
 State 137 69,474 5.19 11.9 31.4
 Carroll Countyd 1 119,116 7.05 14.8 36.2
 Jackson County 1 209,755 12.87 26.7 35.5
 a Weighted by total acres in each county.
 b 1880 dollar values.
 c These counties are Butts (1882), Campbell (1881), Clayton (1881), Coweta (1881), Henry (1882),
 Lincoln (1882), Meriweather (1881), Monroe (1881), Morgan (1882), Pike (1882), Putnam (1881),
 Rockdale (1882), Spaulding (1882), and Troup (1882). The year of adoption is in parentheses. A
 stock law was imposed by legislation in Monroe and Putnam counties, elsewhere it was adopted by
 popular vote.
 d Since I have a 100 percent sample of the manuscript census data from Carroll and Jackson
 counties, I was able to check the aggregate sums presented in the agricultural census against the
 sums from my individual level data. For the most part, the two are consistent. The figures were
 very different, however, for the amount of pasture in Carroll, an important variable in my
 calculation. The aggregate number reported by the census was about double that calculated using
 the micro-data. In the calculation, I use the smaller estimate. If the census number were used, the
 expected benefit would rise to $237,667.
 Sources: Aggregate county-level agricultural and population data were obtained from U.S. Census
 Office, Report, pp. 109-11, 183-84, 218-19, and the Compendium, pp. 341-43, 846-51. The
 procedure used to estimate expected profitability of the stock law is detailed in Kantor, "Property
 Rights," appendix A.
 the table. Similarly, those areas with a positive expected value would
 actually have had larger "real" savings.
 Regions with large tracts of unimproved land used as natural pasture
 would have been hurt by the imposition of the stock law. The average
 loss for a Pine Barrens, Wiregrass, or Coastal county would have been
 between $82,000 and $101,000, or approximately 30 to 40 percent of the
 value of produce grown in the county in 1879. The average Mountain
 county expected a loss from the closed range of nearly $13,000 or 7
 percent of the value of its agricultural production. The greatest benefits
 would have accrued to the most improved counties which made up the
 Plantation Belt and Upcountry regions. The average county in the
 Upcountry could have captured about $109,000 in net benefits from the
 closed range, while Plantation Belt counties expected average net
 benefits of $167,000. For Upcountry and Plantation Belt counties, the
 expected net benefits were 16 and 21 percent, respectively, of the value
 of 1879 agricultural production. The net sum of the profits across all
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 TABLE 2
 DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED BENEFITS AND LOSSES
 FROM STOCK LAW, BY REGION IN 1880
 Range of
 Benefits or
 Losses (in Plantation Pine
 thousands) Mountain Upcountry Belt Barrens Wiregrass Coast State
 Losses
 200to 250 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 150 to 200 1 0 0 1 3 0 5
 100to 150 2 0 2 4 5 2 15
 50to 100 5 3 0 1 3 3 15
 0 to 50 2 1 4 1 4 1 13
 Benefits
 OtoS0 2 3* 5* 1 0 0 11
 50to O00 2 3* 13* 0 1 0 19
 100 to 150 1 10* 11** 0 0 0 22
 150 to 200 2 4 13**t 0 0 0 19
 200to 250 0 1 8*t 0 0 0 9
 250to 300 0 1 3* 0 0 0 4
 300to 350 0 0 2* 0 0 0 2
 350to 400 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 400to450 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
 450to 500 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
 Notes: Each asterisk represents a county that had adopted the stock law by 1882. A dagger
 indicates a county that had the stock law imposed by the state legislature.
 Sources: See Table 1.
 counties in the state would have amounted to $8,007,500, or $69,474 per
 county. If we include the expected savings from negligence payments in
 the railroad industry, the total savings would have risen to more than
 nine million dollars.
 It is important to note that the average expected savings for those
 counties that passed the stock law by 1882 was about $122,000 more
 than the state mean. This observation lends credence to the Davis and
 North hypothesis that institutional change tends to come about when
 the net present value of a new institutional arrangement exceeds that of
 the status quo. Net profitability, however, was not a sufficient condition
 for the adoption of the stock law. Table 2 shows the frequency
 distributions of expected net profits by region and identifies the counties
 that had adopted the law by 1882. In the Plantation Belt, only nine of 39
 counties with an expected gain greater than $100,000 had implemented
 the stock law by 1882. In the Upcountry, 15 counties with a profit
 estimate greater than $100,000 did not adopt the stock law, while two
 others had adopted the law with an expected gain of less than $100,000.
 Why did these 15 counties, and those in the same position in the
 Mountain region, not adopt the relatively profitable law? Attributing the
 failure to transaction costs alone is much too simple, for there is no
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 reason to believe that transaction costs were lower in the counties that
 adopted the stock law than in those that did not.
 The remainder of this article takes a microscopic look at the dynamics
 of institutional change. Since the Georgia legislature reduced the fence
 question to smaller and smaller geographic regions, it is necessary to
 concentrate on very specific politico-geographic areas in order to
 understand the closing of the Georgia range. Because the data require-
 ments are extensive, I focus on the two Upcountry counties that receive
 the most attention in the historical literature-Carroll and Jackson
 counties. Carroll's expected savings of $119,116 were near the top of the
 distribution for the Upcountry, while Jackson's expected savings of
 $209,755 were clearly greater than almost all counties in the Upcountry.
 Relative to the state as a whole, Carroll's profitability ranked in the
 seventh decile, while Jackson's ranked in the top of the ninth.
 Analyzing why Carroll and Jackson counties failed to adopt the stock
 law by the early 1880s offers a rigorous test of the theory that
 institutional change tends to come about as the relative benefits become
 positive. Although the expected gains were high for these counties, they
 did not adopt the new institution right away because of distributional
 conflicts and transaction costs. These difficulties were overcome in
 these two Upcountry Georgia counties only when the political process
 facilitated the institutional change.
 THE DYNAMICS OF FENCE REFORM
 When animals were free to roam the open range and there was no
 legal way to force owners to enclose their livestock, what prevented
 citizens from voluntarily internalizing the externality, as Ronald Coase
 has suggested?21 Since animal owners had a legal right to allow their
 animals to roam the countryside, advocates of the stock law might have
 bribed their neighbors to fence in their stock. Negotiating and enforcing
 such a settlement, however, probably would have proven to be quite
 difficult. It would have required that all animal owners, each of whom
 was a monopolist with some incentive to hold out until he captured the
 entire net expected social gain for himself, agree to forgo their common
 right to the open range. Even if a small group of farmers were able to
 negotiate a contract restricting each other from using the open range,
 enforcing the provisions of the agreement may have been prohibitively
 expensive.
 The Georgia Supreme Court recognized these Coase-type agreements
 between neighbors in Winters v. Jacobs: "If adjacent owners agree to
 dispense with the partition fence and to inclose their land in common, it
 21 Ellickson, in "Of Coase and Cattle," described how Shasta County, California, ranchers
 (circa 1980) were able to use informal norms to internalize some of the externality problems
 associated with an open range situation.
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 is the same as if they are jointly bound to maintain a division fence. The
 agreement is the fence, and each of the parties is bound at his peril to
 keep his cattle on his own land."22 These gentlemanly accords, how-
 ever, could easily sour if one party became lax in his commitment to
 abide by the contract's terms. Consider the bitter dispute between
 neighbors George H. Tumlin and Charles C. Parrott of Bartow County,
 who "had made an agreement not to have any dividing fence as they
 were scarce of timber, and that neither one of them was to pasture their
 lands adjoining each other."23 The problem arose when Parrott's cattle
 strayed onto Tumlin's land, eating the latter's crops. After a period of
 time, Tumlin, having tried unsuccessfully to keep Parrott's livestock off
 his property, shot and killed $240 worth of livestock and maimed
 another $30 worth. Because Tumlin did not recompense his neighbor,
 Parrott sued for treble damages, arguing that Tumlin did not try to drive
 the cattle back home and that Tumlin's land was not enclosed by a legal
 fence.24 The case eventually reached the Georgia Supreme Court, which
 decided against Tumlin-in order to kill animals without responsibility,
 an actual legal fence had to be broken, not merely the agreement to
 dispense with it.25 Although voluntary agreements to reduce some
 fencing expenses were conceivable, monitoring and enforcing the
 agreement was a more difficult matter.
 In 1872 the Georgia General Assembly eased the burden of fence law
 reformers by allowing individual counties to decide whether to fence
 crops or livestock. Whereas before 1872 a single animal owner could
 have forced many farmers to erect fences, after 1872 it took a majority
 vote in a county election to do so. To bring about a fence election, 50
 freeholders were required to file a petition with the county's ordinary
 (chief executive), who advertised their desire for an election. The
 election could be called off, however, if 50 additional freeholders
 presented a counterpetition. If, after the filing of the counterpetition, 25
 more landowners added their names to the original petition, the ordi-
 nary held the election on the first Monday in July. The 1872 act decreed
 that a county could not have more than one fence election per two-year
 period.26 While only freeholders could call for or call off an election, all
 eligible voters were permitted to vote in the referendum.27
 The 1872 legislation was a major victory for stock law supporters in
 Georgia. Since the expected net benefits of the stock law were unevenly
 distributed across the state, fence reformers realized that a statewide
 22 Winters v. Jacobs.
 23 Georgia Supreme Court, "Case File of George H. Tumlin v. Charles C. Parrott."
 24 Ibid.
 25 Tumlin v. Parrott.
 26 Georgia, Session Laws, 1872, No. 329, pp. 34-36.
 27 This arrangement was upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court in Tharpe v. Hardison. In
 addition, the court declared that only freeholders could contest an election after it was held.
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 law, such as the one assumed in the preceding calculations, would be
 difficult to push through the General Assembly. As Commissioner of
 Agriculture J. T. Henderson confirmed in his 1881 report: "The
 interests and industries of different sections of the State are too varied
 to admit of a general [stock] law applicable to all sections."28 In
 Georgia, at least, the legislature maintained that the fence's fate would
 be determined by direct local democracy.29
 Ten years after the legislature allowed county voting on the fence
 issue, only 14 of 88 counties that expected a net benefit had adopted the
 stock law. What prevented the other counties whose adoption would
 have been profitable from following the same course of action? A close
 examination of the data from Carroll and Jackson counties, which are
 both about 40 miles upcountry of Atlanta, reveals that while the stock
 law may have been income-enhancing from a social point of view, the
 median voter was against fence reform. Unresolved distributional
 conflicts caused the stock law's defeat at the county level.
 To see why the 1872 law was, generally, an inadequate mechanism for
 promoting the adoption of the closed range, it is best to identify how
 various coalitions sided on the fence debate. In order to distinguish the
 bases of support for the stock law, I have divided the agricultural
 communities of Carroll and Jackson into six coalitions-landowners
 (expected winners and losers from the stock law), tenants (winners and
 losers), wage laborers, and townspeople. By using a 100 percent
 matched sample of the manuscript agricultural and population schedules
 of the 1880 census, I was able to determine precisely the sizes of the six
 coalitions. Further, I have calculated a profit/loss estimate for each
 owner-operated and tenant farm, assuming that the closed range was
 instituted in 1880.30 Table 3 shows the sizes and the median expected
 benefits or losses for the various coalitions.
 Steven Hahn and Charles L. Flynn, Jr., argued that laborers and
 tenants of both races, along with "very small farmers," formed a
 coalition against reform, while richer white landowners pushed for
 28 Georgia Dept. of Agriculture, Report of the Commissioner, p. 209.
 29 See Kantor, "Property Rights," chap. 4, for a more detailed analysis of the incremental
 political changes relating to the fence question in the postbellum period.
 30 In Jackson County, 76 farmers classified as tenants reported no land, but positive levels of
 cotton and/or corn output and positive livestock holdings. In addition, 11 farmers enumerated as
 tenants reported no land, no cotton or grain production, and no livestock. The nonreporting of such
 data may be evidence supporting the argument in Virts, "Estimating the Importance," that the
 plantation system persisted into the postbellum period. Large plantation-type farms may have hired
 "tenants," but all of the decision making was conducted by the landowner. It might be conjectured
 that Jackson County tenants not reporting pertinent data may have been part of such a plantation
 system. In any case, I have reclassified the 11 tenants who reported no data as farm laborers. Given
 that I have the total agricultural output of the former 76 tenants, I have estimated their tilled
 acreage in each of the various crops based upon the average yields per acre of the other tenant
 farmers in Jackson County. Moreover, I have set their pasture allocations to zero, which will tend
 to bias my results against finding net benefits for these farmers. I found none of the problems
 discussed above in the Carroll County data.
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 TABLE 3
 PREDICTED SIZES OF VOTING COALITIONS-CARROLL AND JACKSON COUNTIES
 Owners Tenants Town
 P 2 0 P < 0 P 2 0 P < 0 Laborer Resident
 CARROLL COUNTY
 Number 438 983 431 479 524 381
 Median net benefit ($) 80.18 -108.62 75.44 -77.71
 Percent of population 13.5 30.4 13.3 14.8 16.2 11.8
 JACKSON COUNTY
 Number 378 751 93 240 1511 206
 Median net benefit ($) 116.38 -120.31 80.20 -87.18
 Percent of population 11.9 23.6 2.9 7.6 47.5 6.5
 Notes and Sources: "P" represents the expected profitability of the stock law to individual
 farmers. The data were collected from the agricultural and population manuscript schedules of the
 1880 census, Carroll and Jackson counties.
 fence reform.3' On the surface, it seems likely that small, relatively poor
 landowners who relied on the open range to feed their animals would
 have been solidly against the stock law. Conversely, wealthier landown-
 ers who could afford to provide pasturage (a strong determinant of a
 farmer's net expected gain from the stock law) for their animals were
 probably the champions of reform.32 The data underlying Table 3,
 however, suggest that this point is somewhat misleading. Farm size
 alone did not determine how a farmer would fare if the laws governing
 unfenced land were changed. Of Carroll's 438 landowners who hypo-
 thetically expected a net gain from the closed range policy, 178 had less
 than 35 acres under till. Similarly, of the 378 winning landowners in
 Jackson, 23 percent had less than 35 acres in production. Moreover,
 there were relatively large farms that stood to lose if the closed range
 were imposed. Of the 983 losing landowners in Carroll, 35 had more
 than 100 tilled acres. Of the 751 losing landowners in Jackson, 86 had
 more than 100 acres in production. The forces that determined a
 farmer's financial interest in the matter were more complicated than a
 simple "haves" versus "have nots" model would suggest.
 Tenants as a class cannot be so easily placed in the fence law camp.
 Better tenants presumably received a higher remuneration for their
 services. The landowner rewarded the good tenant not only for his
 productivity, but also for his careful attention to the owner's land and/or
 livestock. One way to compensate a high-quality tenant may have been
 to provide him with pasture on the landowner's farm. Enclosing animals
 not only saved valuable time spent searching for animals in the forest,
 31 Flynn, White Land, p. 145; and Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism, pp. 248, 262.
 32 In Carroll and Jackson counties, landowners expecting a net gain had an average of eight to
 nine acres of pasture, while expected losers had virtually none. Likewise, winning tenants in
 Carroll had a little more than an acre of pasture, while losers had about none. Winning tenants in
 Jackson were able to negotiate for about five acres of pasture space.
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 but it also corresponded to higher-quality meat and dairy products
 because the animals' food intake could be controlled. According to the
 manuscript schedules of the agricultural census, 40 tenants were able to
 secure pasture land in Carroll and 46 were able to do so in Jackson.
 Although these tenants had pasture, they still had the option to let some
 of their animals roam the countryside. According to contemporary
 evidence and the manuscript data, however, the tenants who received
 pasture were given enough to enclose all of their livestock.33
 Pasture was an item that the tenant had to negotiate with the
 landowner. In the rental contract between James Willbanks and C. M.
 Wood, a landlord from Harmony Grove in Jackson County, the subject
 of pasturage was made quite explicit. Not only was Willbanks "to take
 care of said farm as it was his own," but it was also stated that "there
 is to be noe pastureing on the land of said place that are in cultivation
 [sic]. "34 If the rental contract forbade pasturing on cultivated acreage,
 and provided no formal pasture or unimproved land for animals to
 forage, a tenant then had four options: he could keep no animals, as 6.1
 percent of Carroll and Jackson tenants decided; he could pen his
 animals and feed them purchased grain or fodder grown on his small
 farm; he could rent a plot of pasture; or he could send his livestock out
 into the forest to find food for themselves.35 Presumably, most poor
 tenants chose the latter. Would they all have been hurt by the stock law?
 Table 3 suggests that not all tenants would have been hurt by the stock
 law, and many benefited even though they had no pasture. Because so
 many tenants had few animals, especially in Carroll County, the benefits
 associated with expanding acreage and eliminating large-scale fence
 maintenance would have exceeded the costs of enclosing and feeding
 them. In total, about 47 percent of the tenants in Carroll and 30 percent
 in Jackson stood to gain from fencing animals in, instead of fencing them
 out.
 For those tenants expecting a loss from the stock law, the financial
 injury would have been somewhat tempered by the competitive market
 for labor.36 Since tenants could always migrate, if a county decided to
 close its range while nearby counties retained open range, landowners
 would have had to compensate their tenants for the losses associated
 with inaccessibility to the commons. Contemporaries certainly under-
 stood the power of the competitive market for labor. A "Tenant" in
 Jackson County believed that the stock law was in "the interest of the
 33 For evidence on pasture requirements, see the Jackson Herald, Aug. 31, 1883, and Mar. 30,
 1885.
 34 A.D. O'Rear Collection.
 35 In Carroll County, 714 of 910 (78.5 percent) tenant farmers reported no pasture or unimproved
 land and in Jackson County, 144 of 344 (41.9 percent) tenants were in the same situation.
 36 The competitiveness of the postbellum southern labor market is discussed by Higgs,
 Competition and Coercion; DeCanio, Agriculture in the Postbellum South; and Reid, "Sharecrop-
 ping. "
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 tenant fully as much or more than the land-holder, from the fact that
 whoever furnishes the best pastures will certainly get the best tenants,
 as it is all bosh about the land-holder being more independent than the
 tenant, for what is his land worth to him without labor?" In Rockdale
 County, which was one of the first to pass the stock law, the editor of
 the county newspaper observed that "landlords see who can arrange the
 best pastures to secure the best tenants."37 Thus, not only do the
 expected benefit estimates mar Steven Hahn's and Charles Flynn's
 suggestion that tenants were unanimously in favor of the status quo, so
 do the predictions of economic theory and the statements of contem-
 poraries about the competitive market.
 The assumption that wage laborers were solidly against reform is
 difficult to justify as well. If laborers kept animals on the open range,
 they would have experienced a decrease in real income when the stock
 law was imposed because they would either have had to rent pasture
 and purchase feed or sell the animals. Alternatively, laborers who
 owned no animals were probably indifferent between the two laws, at
 least in the short run. If these individuals expected to own a cow or pig
 one day, then their interests might have leaned toward the status quo.
 On the other hand, the short-term demand for wage labor might have
 increased with the improved acreage and the need to fence pastures
 under the stock law, which could have caused upward pressure on
 wages. Regardless of whether we predict that laborers' incomes would
 have increased or decreased, the competitive market for labor should
 have equalized the wage with that of surrounding open range areas,
 minus moving costs. While a theoretical prediction as to how the farm
 laborers in the two counties sided on the fence question would be
 tenuous, the empirical analysis of the voting returns presented in the
 next section indicates how this pivotal coalition aligned.
 Finally, townspeople who kept small gardens and very few animals
 had incentives to keep animals, usually swine, from roaming through
 their relatively densely populated hamlets. Throughout the postbellum
 period the General Assembly gave the mayors and aldermen of many
 incorporated towns the right to pass local ordinances forbidding animals
 from running at large.38 The town of Carrollton, the county seat of
 Carroll, passed its own local ordinance in March 1886, making it
 unlawful for animals allowed "willfully and negligently" to run at large
 within the corporate limits of the town.39 As town populations grew, the
 costs of maintaining the open range (health costs, for example) in-
 creased rapidly, creating an incentive to rectify the problem through
 37 Jackson Herald, Sept. 1885. See also Jefferson Forest News, June 24, 1881, and June 10, 1881;
 Jackson Herald, July 20, 1883, and Aug. 24, 1883; and Newnan Herald, June 30, 1881.
 38 See, for example, Georgia, Session Laws, 1871, No. 209, p. 109, and No. 190, p. 128.
 39 Carroll Free Press, Mar. 26, 1886.
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 legislation. The town coalition, however, was quite small, amounting to
 only 381 in Carroll and 206 in Jackson.
 The data in Table 3 suggest that the coalition of expected losers
 outnumbered the expected winners. In Carroll the expected beneficia-
 ries included 438 landowners, 431 tenants, and 381 townspeople,
 totalling 1250. The expected losers numbered 983 landowners and 479
 tenants. In Jackson 991 expected losers dominated the 677 expected net
 winners. It is doubtful that laborers in either county would have voted
 for the stock law with sufficient intensity to produce a victory. Indeed,
 throughout the 1880s, each time Carroll and Jackson voters went to the
 polls, stock law supporters were never able to garner more than 27 to 38
 percent of the total votes cast.40 The median voter was clearly in favor
 of the status quo. The only chance that the minority coalition had was
 to compensate a subset of those individuals who expected a loss from
 the proposed law.
 Because landowners and laborers were periodically bargaining with
 one another to determine the rent or wage, contracts could have
 included a contingency clause providing the tenant or laborer with an
 appropriately sized sidepayment to compensate for any expected loss.
 It is unlikely, however, that this type of negotiated settlement would
 have been implemented. First, it is doubtful that many laborers would
 have believed that their employers would have actually compensated
 them once the ballots were cast and the election was over. Second,
 there would have been a problem of free riding if there were no
 mechanism forcing landowners to pay their share of the sidepayments.
 It is not surprising then that many counties that could have profited from
 the stock law failed to achieve the change. As long as the median voter
 was against change and sidepayments could not be effected, the status
 quo, no matter how socially inefficient, would persevere.
 There were two obvious solutions to this problem-either voters who
 had the most to lose by the institutional change could have been
 disfranchised, thereby shifting the median voter toward being a net
 winner, or a formal mechanism could have been created that would have
 eliminated free riding and put the force of the law behind a compensa-
 tion scheme. Although stock law supporters called for the explicit
 disfranchising of voters they thought were blocking reform-landless
 tenants and laborers-the legislature never imposed eligibility require-
 ments on fence elections1 Instead, maintaining its commitment to
 direct local democracy, the Georgia General Assembly created an
 advantage for the reform movement by manipulating the rules governing
 fence elections. In 1881 the legislature removed the restriction limiting
 counties to only biennial votes on the fence issue. Under the new law,
 40 Table 4 contains the sources for the election data.
 41 Calls for fence election disfranchisement can be found in Carroll County Times, May 3, 1878,
 and June 7, 1878; and Georgia Dept. of Agriculture, Annual Report, p. 66.
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Fri, 01 Sep 2017 21:26:30 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Dynamics of Institutional Change Uncovered 877
 the ordinary could call for an election at any time: setting the election
 date during harvest season, for example, when most small farmers,
 tenants, and laborers were busy with their work.42 In addition, a county
 could now hold elections again and again, inevitably dampening turn-
 out, which reduced the number of votes that stock law advocates had to
 win. This advantage only lasted for two years though, when in 1883 the
 legislature restricted a county's vote to once per year, the first Wednes-
 day in July.43
 The most significant legislative change in 1881 permitted referenda on
 the fence issue at the subcounty militia district level. Although similar in
 spirit to the 1872 law, the wording of the ballots was changed for the
 district elections. Instead of voting for "no fence" (stock law) or
 "fence" (status quo) as it was in a countywide referendum, the district
 election required the ballots to read either "stock law" or "for fence."
 Although this may appear to be a subtle nuance, it was not. The
 significance of this rewording will be discussed below. Once passed, the
 stock law went into effect six months after the election, and the district
 had to erect "good and substantial" fences around its circumference in
 order to prevent strays from other places from entering the closed range
 area. This requirement initially made the cost of adopting the stock law
 quite high, but it was struck down by the Georgia Supreme Court in
 1885.44
 The remarkable feature of the 1881 legislature was that it required the
 owners or proprietors of land in militia districts that adopted the stock
 law to provide pasturage for at least one cow and calf for the family of
 each tenant who did his proportionate share of the fencing of the
 pasture. This pasture requirement, which did not pertain to countywide
 elections, acted as a contingency contract, promising to at least partially
 compensate tenants for their losses after the stock law was adopted.
 According to contemporary estimates, a cow and a calf could have been
 pastured on one acre of land. I recomputed the profitability estimates to
 take account of this clause. If a tenant already had pasture before the
 institutional change, his estimate would remain the same. For tenants
 who reported no pasture in the 1880 census, I added one acre of pasture
 to their data and reran the calculation, leaving everything else constant.
 For Carroll County, whereas 47.4 percent of the tenants expected a
 non-negative net benefit from the stock law with no pasture allowance,
 42 Georgia, Session Laws, 1881, No. 110, pp. 60-61.
 43 Georgia, Session Laws, 1883, No. 134, pp. 49-51.
 " The law allowing militia district option is in Georgia, Session Laws, 1881, No. 401, pp. 79-81.
 In Jones v. Sligh the court declared that it was unconstitutional for the county ordinary to levy and
 to collect a tax upon the property of a militia district in order to build and to maintain a fence around
 a district that voted for the stock law. This virtually meant that the fence requirement was
 invalidated. Then in Dover v. The State of Georgia the court was more direct. It ruled that the stock
 law would still go into effect in a militia district that voted for the law even though it did not have
 a fence surrounding its borders. See also Holleman v. Kingery.
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 80.0 percent would have benefited if the landowner were required to
 provide an acre of pasture. For Jackson County, the results show the
 same steep trend, rising from 27.6 percent if no pasture were provided
 to 71.4 percent with a pasture allotment.45 The 1881 law allowing district
 referenda on the fence problem, in effect, made compensation of tenants
 by landowners a reality, and eliminated the free-rider problem by
 requiring all landowners to make the transfer payment. Carroll and
 Jackson counties were able to overcome the distributional conflicts that
 impeded fence reform through the district referenda process. By 1890 all
 but a small area of Carroll County had closed its range and in Jackson
 County six of thirteen militia districts chose the stock law.
 AN EMPIRICAL LOOK
 The hypothesis advanced in the previous section is that Georgia
 counties that expected a positive benefit from the stock law were unable
 to adopt it because the rules governing choice made the cooperative
 solution, which depended on transfer payments, virtually impossible to
 achieve. In other words, there was no mechanism to reduce the
 transactions costs associated with voluntarily bargaining to adopt the
 more profitable institution. In most cases, the 1872 law did not lead to
 the implementation of the closed range where it was profitable. The 1881
 legislation, by allowing for militia district referenda, changed the rules
 of the game and created an opportunity for a coalition among landown-
 ers, tenants, and townspeople to adopt the new institution. This section
 tests empirically whether the legislature's manipulation of the voting
 mechanism influenced the outcome.
 After three frustrating defeats at the countywide level in Carroll and
 two in Jackson, stock law supporters began to concentrate their
 attention on adopting the law at the militia district level. By 1890, 14 of
 the 16 districts in Carroll had adopted the stock law in district referenda.
 In five of these 14 districts, however, the fence law had originally been
 declared the victor, but after being contested on the ground of ballot
 fraud, the county ordinary overturned the results and declared the
 districts stock-law areas. The precise wording of the law, no doubt,
 created confusion among voters as the county election ballots were
 required to read either "fence" or "no fence," the latter meaning the
 stock law. As stated previously, however, the district election ballots
 had to be either "for fence" or for the "stock law." The election in
 Carroll's Bowdon district was particularly muddled as the precinct
 4 An alternative way to interpret the pasture law is to suppose that the landowner would give the
 tenant an acre of pasture, but, at the same time, would reduce the tenant's tilled acreage by an acre.
 Calculating the estimates according to this assumption does not change the results in any dramatic
 fashion. In Carroll, 76.1 percent (instead of 80.0) of the tenants would have favored the stock law
 and the sidepayment. In Jackson, 70.5 percent (instead of 71.4) would have been in favor of the
 closed range.
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 managers certified the result in favor of the fence law 102 to 73. The
 actual vote cast was 73 for "stock law," 68 "for fence," 30 for "fence,"
 2 for "a fence," and 2 for "the fence." The county ordinary, after
 hearing arguments from both sides, threw out the 34 votes not cast "for
 fence," thus leaving a majority of 73 to 68 for the "stock law."46 In the
 remaining nine districts that adopted the stock law through legal
 balloting, the law won with very slight majorities. Therefore, by taking
 advantage of legal ambiguities and by concentrating their attention on
 the much smaller districts, stock law supporters were able to close the
 open range of Carroll and Jackson counties little by little.
 While voter confusion may explain some of the transition to the stock
 law, to what extent did the pasture requirement of the 1881 law offer
 significant compensation to convert would-be losers into stock law
 voters? To answer this question, I analyzed the aggregate voting
 behavior of individual districts within Carroll and Jackson counties.
 From 1881 to 1890, Carroll County held five countywide fence elec-
 tions-in January 1882, September 1882, July 1885, July 1887, and July
 1890. Jackson County held two countywide elections, one in July 1881
 and another in September 1883. In addition, many of the militia districts
 held local-option elections, which were sporadically and incompletely
 reported in the newspapers. I was, however, able to collect the election
 returns from 14 of these district elections. Where the county ordinary
 overturned the results of a district election, I used the figures that were
 reported by the precinct managers and not the results that emerged from
 litigation. The vote reported out of the district represents the "true"
 sentiment of the voters; the final judgment of the ordinary misrepresents
 the actual intention of the voters.
 The first hypothesis to be tested in the empirical analysis is whether
 coalitions voted for the option (stock law or status quo) that promised to
 maximize their net returns. More specifically, did landowners and
 tenants who, if my assumptions were accurate, would have expected a
 non-negative profit from the stock law translate this belief into votes for
 the new institution? Alternatively, did those farmers who anticipated a
 loss vote to keep the range open? Did town dwellers vote for the closed
 range as might be predicted? Finally, which alternative did wage
 laborers support? The second hypothesis tested is that the 1881 rule
 changes governing district elections offered enough incentive to "buy"
 the votes of tenants who previously had no pasture and would have,
 under the pre-1881 structure, expected a net loss from the closed range
 policy.
 The dependent variable in the minimum logit chi-squared estimation
 is voting behavior.47 The independent variables are the percentages of
 46 Carroll Free Press, Mar. 18, 1887, and Mar. 25, 1887.
 47 For a discussion of the econometric model, see Maddala, Limited-Dependent, pp. 29-30.
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 the population (of household heads) that fall into one of six coalitions-
 winning landowners, losing landowners, winning tenants, losing ten-
 ants, townspeople, and rural laborers-and the percentage of the
 eligible electorate not voting. With the matched population and agricul-
 tural data, I am able to determine precisely the values of the indepen-
 dent population variables for each militia district in Carroll and Jackson
 counties. The final independent variable, the percentage of the eligible
 electorate not voting, was used to hold turnout constant. When an
 individual district adopted the stock law, this did not prohibit it from
 voting in forthcoming countywide elections. As J. Morgan Kousser and
 I have shown in "Common Sense or Commonwealth," once a district
 adopted the stock law, its voters subsequently abstained in great
 numbers.48
 Column 1 of Table 4 reports how a change of one standard deviation
 from the mean of the particular variable (holding all else constant)
 affected the probability of voting for the stock law in countywide
 elections. The data for this estimation include only the countywide
 elections (no compensation scheme) and none of the local-option
 district elections. The estimated probability of voting for the stock law
 when all variables are set at their sample means is 0.255. The hypothesis
 that voters clashed according to material self-interest is very much
 supported by the data. As the results in column 1 indicate, an increase
 of one standard deviation in the percentage of landowners who expected
 a loss from the stock law meant that it would lose 3.6 percentage points.
 The proposed law's support was bolstered by 3.4 points as relatively
 more landowners expected to profit from the stock law-profits of 6.4
 points when there were relatively more tenants who expected a net gain,
 and of 8.5 percentage points when there was a higher proportion of
 voters living in towns. These results are statistically significant at better
 than the 10 percent significance level. Only the coefficient for losing
 tenants was not significantly different from zero in the regression.
 Moreover, the data confirm that laborers were solidly against the stock
 law in countywide referenda. Increasing the share of laborers in a
 district by one standard deviation decreased the stock law's vote by 11
 percentage points. Finally, higher voter abstention corresponded to
 greater relative support for the institutional change. Once districts
 adopted the stock law, voters began to abstain. When the closed range
 was voted in, the decision was final, and there really was no reason to
 vote in a countywide election. Kousser and I have shown that instead of
 imposing their views on districts that retained the open range, fence law
 and stock law partisans left the fence question to those who had a direct
 interest in the matter. The regression results indicate that this decreased
 political activity was stronger among fence law partisans. An increase in
 48 Kantor and Kousser, "Common Sense or Commonwealth?" pp. 18-19.
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 TABLE 4
 MARGINAL EFFECTS ON THE PROBABILITY OF VOTING FOR THE STOCK LAW
 Variable (1)a (2)a
 Constant (Laborers)b -0.11 d -0.087d
 Winning Landowner 0.034' 0.001
 Losing Landowner -0.036' -0.042e
 Winning Tenant 0.064d 0.074d
 Losing Tenant 0.000 -0.035
 Townspeople 0.085d 0.063d
 Percent Electorate Abstaining 0.048d 0.042d
 Winning Tenant * District Election -0.032
 Losing Tenant * District Election 0.131
 Laborers * District Election 0.124e
 Estimated Probability of Voting for Stock Law 0.255 0.306
 in a county election'
 Estimated Probability of Voting for Stock Law 0.532
 in a district election
N 92 57
 R 2 0.323 0.484
 Adjusted R2 0.275 0.385
 a The marginal effects reported are the result of increasing each independent variable by one
 standard deviation from its mean (holding all else constant) and then determining how it changed
 the baseline probability (all variables set at their means).
 b To determine the marginal effects that laborers had on the vote, I reran an equation using laborers
 instead of townspeople and determined the laborers' marginal effect from that equation. In other
 words, when running the equations, one of the independent variables had to be excluded because
 they all sum to 100.
 c This is the estimated probability of voting for the stock law in a countywide election, setting all
 of the independent variables at their means. The next row reports the predicted probability
 assuming a district election, governed by the 1881 rules.
 d Significant at the less than or equal to 0.01 level, two-tailed test.
 e Significant at the less than or equal to 0.05 but greater than 0.01 level, two-tailed test.
 f Significant at the less than or equal to 0.10 but greater than 0.05 level, two-tailed test.
 Variables with asterisks indicate interaction between the individual terms.
 Sources: Countywide voting returns were collected from the Carroll County Times, Jan. 13, 1882,
 and Sept. 15, 1882; Carroll Free Press, July 3, 1885, July 8, 1887, and July 4, 1890; and Jackson
 Herald, July 8, 1881, and Sept. 14, 1883. District referenda returns were collected from the Carroll
 Free Press, Sept. 18, 1885, Mar. 11, 1887, Mar. 18, 1887, Apr. 1, 1887, June 24, 1887, July 8, 1887,
 Sept. 9, 1887, Dec. 16, 1887, and Feb. 22, 1889; and Jackson Herald, Oct. 23, 1885, Apr. 23, 1886,
 Sept. 2, 1887, and Nov. 11, 1887. Independent variables were computed using a 100 percent
 matched sample of the agricultural and population manuscript schedules of Carroll and Jackson
 counties.
 the percentage of the electorate abstaining corresponded to a statisti-
 cally significant increase (4.8) in the percent voting for the stock law.
 Thus, the analysis refutes the view that poor landowners, tenants, and
 laborers were uniformly against the stock law policy. There was a group
 of tenants who united with their landowners and their town neighbors in
 an attempt to capture the efficiency gains associated with a closed range.
 How did the changes in the fence election rules affect voting behav-
 ior? The theory above predicts that many tenants expecting a loss
 should have voted for the stock law in district elections, as they would
 have received about an acre of pasture if the law were passed. In order
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 to capture the effects of the rule change, I pool the countywide and
 districtwide voting returns. Since the goal is to distinguish the voting
 behavior of specific coalitions under both voting regimes, the only way
 to obtain unbiased estimates of the behavioral change is to analyze
 militia districts for which countywide and districtwide election data
 exist. Because not all districts held elections and some districts' election
 returns were not recorded in the county newspapers, the number of
 observations in the analysis drops substantially. Since only 13 of 29
 districts in Carroll and Jackson are represented in the study, it is very
 difficult to say confidently that the results offer a precise picture of the
 voting behavior in every district of the two counties. The results offer
 information only about the districts that held local elections which were
 reported in the newspapers.
 Since the 1881 law's pasture requirement was directed at tenants and
 at laborers who were working their way toward becoming tenants, three
 new independent variables are created to test whether tenants (expected
 winners and losers) and laborers voted any differently in district
 referenda. The additional variables are interaction terms between each
 of the tenant coalitions and the laborer coalition and a dummy variable
 that takes the value of one if the observation is a district election (1881
 rules) and zero if it is a countywide election (1872 rules).
 Column 2 of the table reports the results when including the interac-
 tion terms in the estimation. By setting the interaction terms equal to
 zero and the other independent variables at their sample means, I have
 computed the predicted vote for the stock law in a countywide referen-
 dum to test the representativeness of the subsample of districts. The
 estimate of 0.306 of the votes in favor of closing the range is 20 percent
 higher than the 0.255 predicted by the full sample of districts. Therefore,
 those in the subsample represented in column 2 were somewhat more
 inclined toward voting for the stock law than all of the districts in the
 two counties.
 The increased support for the stock law at the district level is difficult
 to precisely pin down. Surprisingly, winning tenants decreased their
 support for the closed range policy in district elections, lowering the
 stock law's probability of success by 0.032 (relative to a countywide
 election). This result is not statistically significant at conventional
 levels, however. The coalition of losing tenants increased the probabil-
 ity of adopting the stock law in a district election by 13.1 percentage
 points (again, relative to a countywide election). Yet, this estimate is not
 statistically significant either. The most statistically significant finding is
 the increase in support by laborers voting in district elections. They
 boosted the stock law's share of the ballots by an additional 12.4
 percentage points over the countywide probability. One explanation for
 this result might be that many laborers anticipated a relatively quick
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 move into tenancy, where they would be guaranteed pasture by law.49
 An alternative hypothesis might be that the laborers' strong support was
 the result of vigorous canvassing by stock law supporters. Since the
 district election involved many fewer people and a smaller geographic
 region, it is possible that the transaction costs associated with compen-
 sating laborers were reduced enough to enable stock law supporters to
 create a winning coalition that included labor acquiescence as well
 (compensated, of course).
 It is clear that the changed election rules enabled stock law supporters
 to enhance the size of their coalition just enough to carry the fence
 election at the district level. If a district in fact held an election, the
 estimation predicts that the stock law garnered 53.2 percent of the
 ballots cast-enough for victory. The 1881 district option law was truly
 successful in building a minimum winning coalition.
 CONCLUDING REMARKS
 Before the Georgia General Assembly began to legislate on the fence
 question, transaction costs made a voluntary, large-scale closing of the
 range virtually impossible. A voluntary solution required the unanimous
 consent of all animal owners to enclose their livestock. A single person
 could hold up reform. Under the 1872 law allowing majority rule at the
 county level, however, it took more than half of the votes cast in an
 election to maintain the status quo. With the median voter against
 reform, sidepayments were necessary to compensate losers (at least a
 coalition of them) for their expected losses if access to the open range
 were cut off. But again, transaction costs associated with overcoming
 free riding among the beneficiaries and the actual process of paying
 bribes most likely made the 1872 law ineffective. Finally, the legislature
 redesigned the rules of fence elections in 1881. The 1881 pasture
 requirement apparently was designed to compensate at least some of the
 expected losers. More importantly, the law forced all landlords to pay
 the bribe-free riding was no longer a feasible strategy.
 The 1881 law did more than provide a mechanism to overcome the
 compensation and free rider problems; it created an opportunity for
 fence reformers to use chicanery in their attempt to close the range. In
 five instances the Carroll County ordinary threw out invalid votes for
 the fence law, leaving a majority for the new institution. It is interesting
 to note that three of the five districts expected net social losses if the
 stock law were imposed. Net benefits, therefore, are neither a sufficient
 nor necessary condition for institutional change to take place. The
 mechanism that governs choice can be manipulated in such a way that
 49 Unfortunately, because the manuscripts from the 1890 census have burned, it is not feasible
 to test the hypothesis that laborers quickly moved up to tenancy after the stock law was
 implemented. The aggregate county data prevent such an analysis as well.
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 allows a subset of the population to profit at the expense of society as a
 whole.
 While Carroll and Jackson counties expected to gain much from the
 stock law, their relative delay in adopting the law illustrates the
 sometimes difficult process of institutional change. The potential for
 efficiency gains did not guarantee the replacement of an old institutional
 arrangement by a new one. When distributional conflicts and transac-
 tion costs hinder the adoption of a relatively profitable institutional
 arrangement, what type of mechanisms are likely to emerge in order to
 resolve the impasse? More attention needs to be paid to the precise
 arrangements that govern choice, for they will dictate whether "the
 more efficient institution . . . will survive and the inefficient ones per-
 ish. 50
 50 North, Structure and Change, p. 7.
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